关键词: 图们江, 国际通航, 博弈, 大联盟, 机制体系

Abstract:

As an important international river of the Northeast Asia, the Tumen River directly adjoins with three countries China, Russia, and Korea by the channel. In the east, it is close to Japan and South Korea across the sea, and to the west of it can be migrated to attract Mongolia through the land bridge. It has a signification of the Tumen River cooperative development that the Tumen River to come true international navigation. Based on the Tumen River international navigation theoretical basis, which illustrated the realization of the Tumen River international navigation basis, historical basis, and legal basis, this paper established a basis of the Tumen River international navigation game theory model and the cooperative game alliance structure. Through the reasonable hypothesis and simplification science, this article will deal with it quantitative qualitative problems, and try to discuss and slove the problems of the Tumen River international navigation, using the transformation game view and methods. The results show that: 1) It is the rational reaction of the most profitable trail to take between Russia and Korea, why is the Tumen River cannot navigate to the sea. The deep root that Russia and Korea take "no-cooperation" strategy is multidimensional interest considerations through geopolitical priority and strategic equilibrium, mainly including the impact of geopolitical relations, multidimensional distribution pattern of the rights and interests, regional international cooperation level of restriction, the regulation of international law, the constraints of resources and environment, and so on multiple factors. 2) the Tumen River navigation obstruction is the results of non-cooperative game strategy adopted by Russia and Korea. However, the situation of non-cooperative is not accord with the social expectation of common development, mutual reciprocity and mutual benefit to China, Russia, and Korea, and it does not comply with a long-term traditional national relationship what the three countries pursuit of “friendly cooperation and coordination” with solemn promise, also does not assort with the international cooperation function of the Tumen River area′s development and opening up. What′s more, it deviates from the usual practice and trend of full development and utilization in the international rivers. 3) Russia, China, and Korea should form a grand coalition to work for the Pareto optimum of the Tumen River international navigation in conflicts around nations. This will bring for not only grand coalition but also its members to maximize efficiency. 4) Goal orientation of the grand coalition structure and its member is exactly opposite to the realization route, and the choice between individual income level and cooperation strategy is not simple linear correlation. So the grand coalition structure is inevitable instable. 5) Due to the lack of endogenous power and self strengthening mechanism about grand coalition, it is important to have the aid of external coercive power such as forced binding law and transfer payment methods, and set up cooperative game social mechanism system in order to ensure its stability. As a response, a cooperative game mechanism of social system should be designed, which is composed of friendly understanding mechanism, the side payment mechanism, institutional mechanism, diplomatic negotiation mechanism, and the internationalization of mechanism.

Key words: the Tumen River, international navigation, game theory, grand coalition, mechanism system